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MAKING THE FUN STOP: YOUTH JUSTICE 
REFORM IN QUEENSLAND  
TERRY HUTCHINSON 
In 2013 the newly elected conservative Liberal National Party government 
instigated amendments to the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld). Boot camps 
replaced court ordered youth justice conferencing. In 2014 there were more 
drastic changes, including opening the Children’s Court proceedings to the 
public, permitting publication of identifying information of repeat offenders, 
removing the principle of ‘detention as a last resort’, facilitating prompt 
transferral of 17 year olds to adult prisons and instigating new bail offences 
and mandatory boot camp orders for recidivist motor vehicle offenders in 
Townsville. This article compares these amendments to the legislative 
frameworks in other jurisdictions and current social research. It argues that 
these amendments are out of step with national and international best 
practice benchmarks for youth justice. Early indications are that Indigenous 
children are now experiencing increased rates of unsentenced remand. The 
article argues that the government’s policy initiatives are resulting in 
negative outcomes and that early and extensive evaluations of these 
changes are essential.  
I INTRODUCTION 
As I said, we had a clear strategy. The first phase was to make the fun stop 
in detention centres by getting rid of the bucking bulls, the jumping castles 
and Xboxes, which we did.  
Jarrod Bleijie (Attorney General Queensland)1 
In 2013 the newly elected conservative Liberal National Party government of 
Queensland instigated amendments to the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld).2 Boot 
                                                 
 Associate Professor, QUT Faculty of Law. Marika Chang was the research assistant for this 
article. 
1 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 March 2014, 596 (Hon J P 
Bleijie, Attorney-General). 
2 The Liberal National government was elected 24 March 2012 with 73 seats in an 89 member 
unicameral Parliament. 
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camps replaced court ordered youth justice conferencing. In 2014 more 
drastic changes were made, including: 
opening Children’s Court hearings for matters concerning repeat 
offenders and permitting the names of these children to be made 
public; 
removing the sentencing principle of ‘detention and imprisonment as 
a last resort’ from the Youth Justice Act 1992 and from the common 
law;3  
mandating the transfer of seventeen-year-old offenders with six or 
more months remaining on their sentence to an adult correctional 
facility; 
creating a new breach of bail offence for young offenders who are 
found guilty of committing an offence while on bail; and  
mandating boot camp orders for recidivist motor vehicle offenders in 
Townsville.4 
This article compares these amendments to the legislative frameworks in other 
jurisdictions and to the findings of current social research. It argues that these 
amendments diverge from the tenor of the fundamental legal principles 
encapsulated in the Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.5 The amendments are out of 
step with national and international best practice benchmarks for youth 
justice.   
                                                 
3 See, eg, R v WAY; Ex parte Attorney-General [2013] QCA 398 compared to new s 150(5) 
Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld). 
4 There are two additional amendments (allowing juvenile findings of guilt to be admissible 
when adults are being sentenced, and removing sentencing reviews) which are not examined 
in this article. The Youth Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Qld) s 7C 
omitted pt 6, div 9, sub-div 4 (Reviews of sentences by Childrens Court judge) from the Youth 
Justice Act 1992 (Qld). Section 8 of the amending legislation inserted new s 148(3) 
concerning the admissibility of a childhood finding of guilt on sentencing.  
5 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 
3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) <https://www.unicef.org.au/Discover/What-we-
do/Convention-on-the-Rights-of-the-Child/childfriendlycrc.aspx>. 
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II THE CONTEXT 
The changes were foreshadowed in a Justice Department Discussion paper, 
released in June 2013 — to which the government solicited public responses 
via submissions — as well as a widely criticised web-based survey 
instrument.6 Only a summary of the results has been made publicly available. 
Of the 4184 respondents to the survey, 47.1 per cent were in an older age 
bracket (40−65 years).7 Over three quarters (76.8 per cent of the respondents) 
‘had been a victim, or had a family member who was a victim, of a crime’, 
with 37.3 per cent of the incidents occurring within the previous 12 months.8 
In addition, the Opposition members were quick to point out that the survey 
responses did not fully support the actual government amendments: ‘Two of 
the proposals did not have majority support and the other two were carefully 
worded and did not ask whether people supported them but merely whether 
they thought they would be effective’.9 Despite the skewed make-up of the 
respondent group, the responses to the Safer Streets survey also had favoured 
‘providing education and employment (77.5%), providing better support to 
children experiencing violence and neglect (76.8%), and providing treatment 
to tackle drug addiction (73.7%)’ as the most effective interventions.10 In 
addition, the survey responses favoured ‘early intervention and prevention 
(75.4%), and employment programs (71.1%)’ as being effective reforms.11 
After the legislation was introduced into Parliament, the Legal Affairs and 
Community Safety Committee received 25 written submissions, including 
those from the university law schools (Queensland University of Technology, 
Bond University and Griffith University), the ARC funded Comparative 
Youth Penality Project, the Youth Advocacy Centre Inc, the Queensland Law 
Society, the Queensland Bar Association and Amnesty International. 
Additional submissions were sought on further amendments presented while 
the legislation was under consideration by the Parliament’s Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee. There are a total of 33 public submissions 
                                                 
6 Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Safer Streets Crime Action Plan – Youth Justice 
(18 July 2013) Queensland Government <http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/corporate/ 
community-consultation/community-consultation-activities/past-activities/safer-streets-crime-
action-plan-youth-justice>. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 March 2014, 604 (Bill Byrne).  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. 
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available on the Committee website.12 Overwhelmingly, the tenor of the 
public submissions was critical of the punitive nature of the new provisions. 
The Youth Advocacy Centre concluded that ‘There is no research or evidence 
to support the contention that the proposed amendments will reduce offending 
… the results are likely to be the reverse’.13 The Institute commented that ‘this 
bill is unnecessary and at odds with empirical evidence of what works in 
juvenile justice’.14 The Centre for Law, Governance and Public Policy at 
Bond University submitted that the government should take ‘an evidence-
based approach’, ‘ensure that any program or service implemented by any 
stakeholders is comprehensively evaluated’ and ‘recognise the developmental 
characteristics of young offenders’. Its recommendation was that ‘the Bill 
should not be passed’.15 The government promised that strategies to balance 
inequities arising from the amendments would be addressed in funded 
interventions and programs for at-risk children — a Blueprint for the Future 
of Youth Justice in Queensland.16 This Blueprint has never been released.  
The reforms to the youth justice system in Queensland were premised on the 
assumption that offending by young people is increasing. In fact, the statistics 
demonstrate that ‘rates per 100,000 juveniles in detention in Queensland have 
been relatively stable’.17 The most recent Children’s Court of Queensland 
Annual Report reiterates that ‘the trend line in relation to the number of 
juveniles dealt with shows a decline’ over the last 10 years.18 This is 
consistent with national statistics. According to Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(‘ABS’) figures the number of youth offenders (10–19 year olds) decreased 
                                                 
12 Queensland Government, Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, 
<http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/work-of-committees/committees/LACSC/inquiries/past-
inquiries/YouthJustice2014>. 
13 Youth Advocacy Centre Inc, Submission No 24 to Legal Affairs and Community Safety 
Committee, Youth Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014, February 2014, 15. 
14 Law and Justice Institute (Qld) Inc, Submission No 20 to Legal Affairs and Community 
Safety Committee, Youth Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014, February 2014, 
1. 
15 The Centre for Law, Governance and Public Policy, Bond University, Submission No 13 to 
Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, Youth Justice and Other Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2014, February 2014, 2, 3. 
16 Queensland Government, Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee Report No 58: 
Queensland Government Response (2014) <https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/ 
committees/LACSC/2014/YouthJustice2014/gr-18Mar2014.pdf>. 
17 Kelly Richards, ‘What Makes Juvenile Offenders Different from Adult Offenders?’ (2011) 
409 Trends and Issues in Crime & Criminal Justice 2. 
18 Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Qld), Childrens Court of Queensland Annual 
Report 2012–2013 (2014), 2. 
2014 YOUTH JUSTICE REFORM IN QUEENSLAND 247 
by 6 per cent in 2012–13.19 Queensland figures for the same period show a 7 
per cent decrease.20 This is also consistent with international trends, with the 
arrests of young people in England and Wales falling by 20 per cent from 
2010/11 to 2011/12.21 Juvenile arrests data for the United States in 2011 
showed that arrests were down ‘11 percent from 2010 and down 31 percent 
since 2002’.22  
However the Childrens Court Reports for both 2011–2012 and 2012–13 
identified that ‘the statistics seem to demonstrate that there are a number of 
persistent offenders who are charged with multiple offences’.23 The 
government focused on this small group of ‘repeat’ or ‘persistent’ offenders 
— the 10 per cent responsible for up to 49 per cent of charges.24 Recidivism 
among this small group became a focus during the debates on the Bill.25 The 
amendments were therefore directed towards this small core of persistent 
youth offenders who commit serious crimes and who do not exit the system 
when treated using conventional youth court procedures. It was argued that 
this group justified a stricter approach.  
At first glance this appears a logical policy objective, but targeted 
interventions have been used previously in South Australia for juveniles in the 
serious offender group and with limited success. Only a handful of 
declarations have been made under those provisions, and at least one 
declaration was overturned on appeal.26 The new Queensland amendments are 
much broader. The ‘last resort’ principle has been totally removed from the 
                                                 
19 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Youth Offenders Decrease by 6 Percent (27 February 2014) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/4519.0~2012-13~Media 
%20Release~Youth%20offenders%20decrease%20by%206%20per%20cent%20(Media%20
Release)~8>. 
20 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Recorded Crime — Offenders, 2012-13 — Queensland (24 
March2014) <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4519.0main+features282012-
13>. 
21 Ministry of Justice (UK), Youth Justice Statistics 2012/13 England and Wales (2014) 18. 
However, it is unknown how many young people are diverted from the Youth Justice System 
after initially coming into contact with police: at 14.  
22 US Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile 
Offenders and Victims: National Report Series Bulletin: Juvenile Arrests 2011 (2013), 1.  
23 Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Qld), above n 18, 2; Department of Justice and 
Attorney-General (Qld), Childrens Court of Queensland Annual Report 2011–2012 (2013), 6. 
24 Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Qld), The State of Queensland Department of 
Justice and Attorney-General Annual Report 2012–13 (2014) 24–5. 
25 See, eg, Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 March 2014, 608–9 
(Verity Barton). 
26 See R v P A; P A v Police [2011] SASCFC 3 where an appeal against the making of such an 
order was allowed. 
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legislation — not just for a specific serious offender group. The breach of bail 
offences apply to young people who have simply been charged with (not 
convicted of) offences, placed on bail because they are supposedly not in a 
high risk category and then are convicted of another (possibly very minor) 
offence. The original charge may represent the first time a child has been 
charged with an offence.  
Other amendments, such as the ‘naming and shaming’ provisions, apply to a 
child who is ‘not a first time offender’.27 The definition is not limited to those 
children convicted of serious or violent offences, and would ostensibly catch 
those involved in a second rather than a third or subsequent offence. It is not 
clear whether all the offences could arise from the one incident, so that if, for 
example, a child were convicted of one offence, and then appeared on a 
separate charge arising from the same incident, the child would at that point 
no longer be ‘a first time offender’. In any case, the statistics demonstrate that 
the majority of childhood offending relates to theft offences, many of which 
are minor, rather than more serious violent offences.28 The boot camp orders, 
removal of seventeen-year-olds to adult gaols, and breach of bail orders are 
examples of mandatory sentencing orders which remove the judicial 
discretion that would allow the courts to consider the child’s individual needs 
and the optimum response to them, so as to ensure the best chances of 
rehabilitation.   
Blanket sentencing practice can have unequal outcomes. Australian Institute 
of Health and Welfare statistics demonstrate, for example, that throughout the 
four year period to June 2012, ‘the majority of young people in detention on 
an average night in Queensland were Indigenous’, and up to 50 per cent of 
these children were unsentenced (including those awaiting a court hearing or 
trial or those convicted and awaiting sentencing).29  Remand figures up to 
June 2013, shown in the following graph, demonstrate a rise in Indigenous 
children being held in custody prior to sentence. This trajectory is unlikely to 
improve under the changed legislative policies.  
                                                 
27 Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) s 299A(1)(b). 
28 Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 20: ‘The most common principal offence for youth 
offenders was Theft, accounting for nearly a quarter (24 per cent) of all youth offenders’; 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4519.0 – Recorded Crime – Offenders, 2012–13 (Youth 
Offenders) (27 March 2014) <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by% 
20Subject/4519.0~2012-13~Main%20Features~Youth%20offenders~19>. In Queensland, for 
youth offenders in 2012–13, the most prevalent principal offences (as measured by the 
offender rate per 100 000 persons aged 10–19 years), were illicit drug offences (696), and 
theft (695).  
29 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Juvenile Justice Series no 13: Youth Detention 
Population in Australia 2013 (2013) 2, 36, vii. 
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Youth Detention Trends Queensland June 2008 – June 201230
 
The increase in the number of unsentenced Indigenous children being held in 
detention was evident prior to the actual legislative amendments. Charges 
against juveniles increased in 2012–13.31 The Annual Report suggests that this 
was the result of ‘a substantial drop in the number of cautions being 
administered by police and legislative amendments which abolished the 
diversionary mechanism of court ordered Youth Justice conferencing’.32 
According to a recent Draft of the Youth Detention Centre Demand 
Management Strategy, ‘there has been an unprecedented growth in the 
numbers of young people sentenced and remanded to youth detention in 
Queensland in recent years’.33 The statistics demonstrate that the daily 
average of young people detained has increased almost 36 per cent from 137 
to 187 in the three years from 2011–12 to 2013–14.34 The percentage of 
children held on remand had also increased in 2013 compared to the previous 
                                                 
30 Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Juvenile Justice Series no 11: Juvenile 
Detention Population in Australia 2012 (2012) 36.  
31 Above n 19, 2.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Youth Detention Centre Demand Management 
Strategy 2013–2023 (September 2014), 4 <http://www.scribd.com/doc/240007412/Draft-
Youth-Detention-Centre-Demand-Management-Strategy>. 
34 Ibid 8. 
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year (78 per cent compared to 67 per cent), and the period of remand had 
increased from 29.3 days in 2011–12 to 35.2 days in 2013–14.35 The optimum 
capacity of the detention facilities was exceeded for 350 days in 2013.36 The 
Consultation Draft study warns of an escalating risk cycle associated with 1) 
overcrowding stemming from room-sharing, 2) impacts to program delivery 
and services, 3) increased risks of adverse incidents, and 4) lockdowns caused 
by negative impacts on staff and staff availability.37 The Strategy also warns 
that the impact of any initiatives to divert children away from detention in the 
promised ‘Blueprint’ is unlikely to be significant because of the existing 
‘policy momentum in favour of detention’.38  
III THE AMENDMENTS 
The Youth Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 commenced on 
28 March 2014. Subsequent amendments have been made to address 
inadequacies in the legislation, including provisions covering security in the 
boot camps.39 The amendments resulted in eight fundamental changes to 
youth justice processes and outcomes in Queensland, many of them targeting 
the small group of repeat offenders identified in the statistics and noted in the 
Children’s Court Annual Report. This article examines the substance of these 
changes and in doing so compares the laws to those in place elsewhere. 
A Categorising Youth as ‘First-Time Offenders’ and 
‘Those Who Are Not First-Time Offenders’ 
The Youth Justice Act 1992 and the Children’s Court Act 1992 (CCA) 
regulate all proceedings dealing with youth offenders in Queensland. There 
are two jurisdictional tiers in the court — a Magistrate’s Court and a separate 
Children’s Court of Queensland constituted by judges of the District Court. 
Both courts have jurisdiction over offenders under the age of 17 years old, but 
indictable offences, that is, those crimes and misdemeanours only triable upon 
indictment, must be tried by a Children’s Court judge and a jury.  
The amendments categorise an offender as a child who is a ‘first-time 
offender’ and a child who is ‘not a first-time offender’. The legislation defines 
                                                 
35 Ibid 9. 
36 Ibid 8, fn 10. 
37 Ibid 16. 
38 Ibid 14. 
39 Explanatory Notes, Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2014 (Qld).  
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a first-time offender as ‘a child who at any time during a proceeding has not 
been found guilty of an offence’.40 The term ‘not a first-time offender’ is not 
defined in the new provisions. The first-time offender definition refers to 
those found guilty of an ‘offence’, that is ‘an act or omission which renders 
the person doing the act or making the omission liable to punishment’.41 
Section 3 of the Criminal Code (Qld) divides ‘offences’ into criminal offences 
and regulatory offences, with criminal offences comprising indictable and 
simple offences.  
Unlike the position under the South Australian legislation, this categorisation 
does not target those children who have been charged and convicted of 
serious, indictable or violent offences on several occasions. In that state, the 
Statutes Amendment (Recidivist Young Offenders and Youth Parole Board) 
Act 2009 (SA) included a new category of ‘recidivist young offender’ in 
section 20C of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) and the Young 
Offenders Act 1993 (SA).42 To come under this provision the young offender 
has to have been convicted three times of one of a number of very serious 
offences. The recidivist young offender is to be sentenced to detention and has 
a non-parole period of four-fifths of the head sentence. In addition, unlike the 
Queensland Act, the 2009 South Australian legislation included an early 
review provision, and the Social Development Committee of the South 
Australian Parliament is currently reviewing this legislation. The Law Society 
of South Australia’s submission on the Review questions the ‘relevancy, 
necessity and effectiveness’ of such labelling provisions,43 and the need to 
legislate for a minority of offenders when the existing legislation already has 
‘sufficient scope to respond’ to the offending.44 This was also the case with 
the previous Queensland provisions and, on a plain reading of these new 
amendments, children who have been found guilty of minor offences will be 
treated in a similar manner to those children who have been found guilty of 
very serious indictable offences.  
                                                 
40 Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) sch 4. 
41 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 2. 
42 If a young offender was categorised in this way then according to s 23(4) of the Young 
Offenders Act 1993 (SA) ‘a sentence of detention must not be imposed for an offence unless 
(a) the offender is a recidivist young offender; or (b) in any other case—the Court is satisfied 
that a sentence of a non-custodial nature would be inadequate (i) because of the gravity or 
circumstances of the offence; or (ii) because the offence is part of a pattern of repeated 
offending’. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Law Society of South Australia Children and the Law Committee, Submission No 4 to The 
Social Development Committee, Inquiry into the Statutes Amendment (Recidivist Young 
Offenders and Youth Parole Board) Act 2009, 29 August 2014, 1.  
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B Opening the Children’s Court for Hearings of 
Matters for ‘Repeat Offenders’ and Permitting 
Publication of Identifying Information for This 
Group 
Section 301(3) of the Youth Justice Act 1992 states that there is to be no 
publication of ‘identifying information about a first-time offender’ unless ‘the 
publication is necessary to ensure a person’s safety’. In fact, the courts have 
always had the power under section 234 of the Act45 to allow the publication 
of identifying information regarding juvenile offenders (whether charged with 
a first or subsequent offence) when they consider such publication to be in the 
interest of justice,46 when the offence carries a life sentence or when the 
offence involves violence, or when the offence is of a particularly heinous 
nature.47 However for those children ‘who are not first-time offenders’ 
proceedings are to be held in open court.48  
In addition, according to the new section 299A of the Youth Justice Act 1992, 
information about a child ‘who is not a first time offender’ is to be made 
public unless there is an order in place prohibiting publication. Such a child 
could be appearing before the court charged with a less serious matter. This 
provision actually creates a ‘second strike’ penalty, and it is not clear whether 
it would cover, for example, three charges arising out of the same incident 
(for example ‘ham, cheese and tomato’ type charges equivalent to charges of 
drunk and disorderly conduct, resisting arrest and assaulting police).49 The 
court retains a discretion to make an order prohibiting the publication of 
identifying information about the child such as the child’s name, address, 
school or place of employment, or a photograph, picture, videotape or other 
visual representation of the child or someone else, if it considers that such a 
prohibition ‘is in the interests of justice’.50 There is potential for delays to 
                                                 
45 Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) s 234. See also s 176(3)(b), not amended in 2014. 
46 Ibid s 234(4). 
47 See Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) s 176(3)(b). See also R v Rowlingson [2008] QCA 395 for 
an example of where this would be thought necessary. Cf R v SBU [2012] 1 Qd R 250 and R v 
Maygar; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld); R v WT; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2007] 
QCA 310. 
48 Childrens Court Act 1992 (Qld) s 21C. A proceeding before the court for a matter in relation 
to a child who is ‘not a first-time offender’ must now be held in open court, unless the court 
‘(a) orders the court be closed; or (b) excludes a person under s 21E’.  
49 Australian Human Rights Commission, Indigenous Deaths in Custody 1989–1996: A Report 
Prepared by the Office of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice 
Commissioner (1996) ch 6 <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/indigenous-deaths-
custody-chapter -6-police-practices>. 
50 Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) s 299A(4), sch 4. The examples given in the Act include 
‘identifying particulars’. See Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) sch 6. 
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occur while defence counsel argue for a closed court, but it is too early to 
assess the administrative and cost implications of these changes. 
Coincidentally, as these changes were being made, the separate Childrens 
Court building in Brisbane was closed and all children’s matters were 
transferred to the sixth floor of the main Magistrates Court building, 
potentially making children’s matters more accessible to media scrutiny. 
These amendments are unique among the Australian jurisdictions apart from 
the Northern Territory. The Australian Capital Territory,51 New South 
Wales,52 South Australia,53 Tasmania,54 Victoria55 and Western Australia56 
have all legislated to ban the publication of particulars identifying juvenile 
offenders.57 In New South Wales there are exceptions where a ‘person is 
convicted of a serious children’s indictable offence and where the court 
authorises publication’.58 In Western Australia the Supreme Court may allow 
publication under section 36A of the Children’s Court of Western Australia 
Act 1988 (WA) after considering ‘the public interest and the interests of the 
child’59 and, similarly, in Victoria the President of the Children’s Court retains 
a discretion to allow publication on application.60 Only the Northern Territory 
has a contrary rule.61 In that jurisdiction all proceedings are held in open court 
                                                 
51 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 712A; Children and Young People Act 2008 (ACT) s 77 
(Family group conference). 
52 Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 15A; Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW) 
s 65. 
53 Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) s 13(1). 
54 Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) ss 22, 31; Magistrates Court (Children’s Division) Act 1998 
(Tas) s 12. 
55 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) s 534. 
56 Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA) s 40; Children’s Court of Western Australia Act 1988 (WA) 
s 35. 
57 Duncan Chappell and Robyn Lincoln, ‘Naming and Shaming of Indigenous Youth in the 
Justice System: An Exploratory Study of the Impact in the Northern Territory’ (Final Report 
for Grant G2009/7475, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 
Canberra, ACT, 2012) 18. 
58 Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 15C. 
59 Children’s Court of Western Australia Act 1988 (WA) s 36A. 
60 The Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) s 534 prohibits any publication about 
proceedings that may identify the child, except with the permission of the President.  
61 Unless an order is made under s 50 of the Youth Justice Act (NT), information can be 
published about a youth involved in proceedings (under s 49 proceedings against young 
people are in open court; therefore the material can be published unless an order is made to 
prevent publication).  
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so that all material is liable to be published unless an order is made to prevent 
publication.62  
The basis for these protections can be found in international human rights law. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child includes rights to privacy in article 
16 and article 40. Article 16 states that: 
1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
or her privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or 
her honour and reputation.  
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks’.63 
Article 40 of the Convention states: 
1. Parties [to the agreement] recognize the right of every child alleged as, 
accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in 
a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and 
worth, which reinforces the child's respect for the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child's age 
and the desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and the child's 
assuming a constructive role in society.  
2. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of international 
instruments, Parties shall, in particular, ensure that: …. 
(b) Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law 
has at least the following guarantees: …. 
(vii) To have his or her privacy fully respected at all stages of 
the proceedings. 
In addition, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice (‘The Beijing Rules’) also includes a 
statement on the protection of privacy: 
8.1 The juvenile's right to privacy shall be respected at all stages in order to 
avoid harm being caused to her or him by undue publicity or by the process 
of labelling.  
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 
3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).  
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8.2 In principle, no information that may lead to the identification of a 
juvenile offender shall be published.64 
The year 2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. This Convention had its beginnings in the post-World War 1 era. In 
1920 Eglantyne Jebb who was President of the Save the Children Fund and 
the International Red Cross Committee, established the Save the Children 
International Union, in order to address the welfare of children post-War.65 
The Save the Children International Union developed five aims and these 
were the basis for the Declaration of the Rights of the Child.66 The 
Declaration, known as the Geneva Declaration, was adopted and proclaimed 
in the General Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1924.67 It 
was followed in 1959 by the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child, and 
in 1978 Poland presented a draft of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
to the Commission on Human Rights.68 In 1979 the United Nations 
announced the International Year of the Child but a final draft of the 
Convention was not submitted to the UN General Assembly until 1989. The 
Convention was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on 20th 
November 1989.69 Whilst the Convention on the Rights of the Child has not 
been legislated into Australian law directly, it was ratified by the Australian 
government in December 1990 and became binding on Australia in January 
1991.70 In Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh, which involved 
a review of a ministerial decision to deport a family’s supporting parent, the 
High Court held that ratification of the Convention created a legitimate 
expectation that the Minister would act in conformity with the Convention 
‘and treat as a primary consideration the best interests of the children’.71  
                                                 
64 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (‘The 
Beijing Rules’) GA Res 40/33, 96th mtg, , UN Doc A/40/53 (29 November 1985). 
65 Eugeen Verhellen, Convention on the Rights of the Child: Background, Motivation, 
Strategies, Main Themes (Garant 1994) 57–9. And see generally Andrew Trotter and Harry 
Hobbs, ‘A Historical Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform in Queensland’ (2014) 38(2) 
Criminal Law Journal 77. 
66 Verhellen, above n 65, 58. 
67 League of Nations, Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 (adopted 26 
September 1924). 
68 Verhellen, above n 65, 66. 
69 Ibid 70. 
70 Michael Kirby, ‘The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by Reference to 
International Human Rights Norms’ (1998) 62 Australian Law Journal 514. 
71 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 128 ALR 353; Lesianawai v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 897 [32]. 
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Australia has not yet signed the Third Optional Protocol to the Convention, 
the Protocol having been adopted by the UN General Assembly on 19 
December 2011. Under article 5, it allows individual children to bring 
complaints to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child alleging a 
violation of human rights.72 Therefore individual children in Australia cannot 
take an action to the International Court of Justice as occurred with Nick 
Toonen when he made an application to the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee challenging existing provisions of the Tasmanian Criminal Code 
under the First Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.73  
In addition, despite the Convention not being directly incorporated into 
Australian law74 and the inability of children to bring complaints to the 
international forum, the Australian Human Rights Commission has 
investigative powers in relation to Australia’s implementation or breach of the 
Convention.75 The Commission can investigate complaints concerning any 
breaches of international human rights obligations committed by or on behalf 
of the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth agency in the exercise of a 
discretion or in abuse of power.76 As a result Parliament can be advised to 
amend the legislation or take action to ensure compliance.77  
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child monitors the 
implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by States Parties 
to it. As a State Party to the Convention, Australia submits regular reports to 
the UN Committee on how the rights are being implemented in Australia. In 
the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
in relation to its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Australia in 
                                                 
72 United Nations Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
Communications Procedure GA, 66th sess, UN Doc A/C.3/66/L.66 (2 November 2011). See 
also Paula Gerber, Children and Human Rights Abuses: Coming to an International Stage?, 
(30 January 2014) The Conversation <http://theconversation.com/children-and-human-rights-
abuses-coming-to-an-international-stage-22396>. 
73 Human Rights Committee, Toonen v Australia, 15th sess, Communication No 488/1992, UN 
Doc CCPRC/50/D/488/1992 (31 March 1994) [2.1]. 
74 Australian Human Rights Commission, The Human Rights Brief No 2 (1999) [4] 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/human-rights-brief-no-2>; George Winterton, 
‘Limits to the Use of the “Treaty Making Power”’ in Philip Alston and Madelaine Chiam 
(eds), Treaty-Making and Australia: Globalisation versus Sovereignty (The Federation Press, 
1995) 34, 35. 
75 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 11(1)(aa)–(ab). See also the 
instruments listed at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UniversalHuman 
RightsInstruments.asp>. 
76 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 11(1)(aa)–(ab). 
77 Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 74, [4]. 
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2012, the Committee commented on the inadequacy of privacy protection for 
children involved in penal proceedings in Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory, where the publication of personal details was permitted.78 The 
Preamble to the Convention acknowledges the Declaration of the Rights of 
the Child, and that ‘the child, by reason of his physical and mental 
immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after birth’.79 Therefore it is appropriate that the 
state provide those legal safeguards. Australia is due to submit its combined 
fifth and sixth periodic reports on progress under the Convention and its 
optional protocols by 15 January 2018.80 This Queensland amendment will 
constitute a backward step for Australia’s compliance record.  
Queensland legislation must also conform to the Legislative Standards Act 
1992 (LSA) which sets out the fundamental legislative principles underlying 
‘a parliamentary democracy based on the rule of law’.81 According to these, 
legislation must have sufficient regard to ‘the rights and liberties of 
individuals’. The Queensland Parliament’s Legal Affairs and Community 
Safety Committee (LACSC) identified that clause 21 of the Youth Justice and 
Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 (Qld) inserting section 299A of the 
Youth Justice Act (publication where children are not first time offenders) 
would operate retrospectively and hence apply to criminal proceedings that 
had commenced prior to the amendments. This retrospectivity would also 
apply to other of the Youth Justice Act amendments, including findings of 
guilt while on bail, removal of the principle of detention as a last resort, and 
automatic transfers to corrective services facilities.82 The Parliamentary 
Committee’s response indicated that these abrogations of rights were justified 
in order to avoid ‘potential disruption to the courts, as provided in the 
Explanatory Notes’.83 The Report quotes the Explanatory Notes to the Bill to 
the effect that ‘These amendments are accordingly justified on the basis that 
                                                 
78 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 44 of the Convention Concluding Observations: Australia, 16th sess, 29 May–15 
June 2012, UN Doc CRC/C/AUS/CO/4 (28 August 2012) 9, 10; Duncan Chappell and Robyn 
Lincoln, ‘Shhh… We Can’t Tell You: An Update on the Naming and Shaming of Young 
Offenders’ (2009) 20(3) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 476.   
79 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 
3 (entered into force 2 September 1990). 
80 Australian Human Rights Commission, Reporting to the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child? (18 December 2014) <http://www.humanrights.gov.au/reporting-un-committee-rights-
child>.  
81 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 4. 
82 Queensland, Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, Public Hearing—Youth Justice 
and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 Transcript, 3 March 2014, 41. 
83 Ibid 43. 
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they strike an appropriate balance between protecting children appearing 
before the youth justice system while holding young offenders and 
particularly repeat offenders more properly to account’.84 The Committee was 
therefore of the view that ‘strong arguments’ existed to justify the adverse 
effects the retrospective legislation would impose.85 These arguments were 
not identified in the Report. Two Committee members did not support the Bill 
and registered a dissent to the Report.86  
To endorse the naming and labeling of a child (and by implication their 
parents, siblings and community) can lead to long term detrimental effects on 
their education and work prospects. Submissions on the proposed bill from 
various groups, including the Bar Association of Queensland, the Caxton 
Legal Centre, the Queensland Council for Civil Liberties, and Griffith 
University, pointed out that naming has numerous negative repercussions such 
as inhibiting rehabilitation, stigmatising the child, identifying and impacting 
on third parties (including parents, siblings and others in the community) and 
increasing recidivism. Naming has a disproportionate impact on 
disadvantaged youths as against those with financial support.87 The Northern 
Territory ‘naming and shaming’ provisions have been widely criticised.88 The 
identification of young people in the Northern Territory translated to reporting 
in the media in an uneven fashion so that some media organisations had a 
policy not to report, some were reporting on suppression orders, and in other 
instances the names were made available in national newspapers.89 In 
addition, the NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice 2008 
investigation into the relative benefits and disadvantages of public naming for 
youth offenders found that naming would have a detrimental impact on youth 
offenders and their rehabilitation and on victims of crime and their families.90  
                                                 
84 Explanatory Notes, Youth Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 (Qld) quoted 
in Queensland, Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, Public Hearing—Youth 
Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 Transcript, 3 March 2014, 14.   
85 Queensland, Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, Public Hearing—Youth Justice 
and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 Transcript, 3 March 2014, 44. 
86 Bill Byrne (ALP Rockhampton) and Peter Wellington (IND Nicklin). 
87 Queensland, Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, Public Hearing—Youth Justice 
and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 Transcript, 3 March 2014, 7–9. 
88 Chappell and Lincoln, above n 57; Jodie O’Leary, ‘Naming Young Offenders: Implications 
of Research for Reform’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 377. 
89 Chappell and Lincoln, above n 57; Chappell and Lincoln, above n 78.   
90 New South Wales Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Legislative Council, The 
Prohibition on the Publication of Names of Children involved in Criminal Proceedings 
(2008).  
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Endorsing the naming and labeling of a child (and by implication their 
parents, siblings and community) can lead to long term detrimental effects on 
their education and work prospects. Submissions on the proposed bill from 
various groups including the Bar Association of Queensland, the Caxton 
Legal Centre, the Queensland Council for Civil Liberties, and Griffith 
University, pointed out that naming has numerous negative repercussions such 
as inhibiting rehabilitation, stigmatising the child, identifying and impacting 
on third parties (including parents, siblings and others in the community), 
increasing recidivism, and disproportionate impacts on disadvantaged youths 
rather than those with financial support.91 The Northern Territory ‘naming and 
shaming’ provisions have been widely criticised.92 Identification of young 
people in the Northern Territory found that it translated to reporting in the 
media in an uneven fashion so that some media organisations had a policy not 
to report, some were reporting on suppression orders and in other instances 
the names were made available in national newspapers.93 In addition, the 
NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice 2008 investigation into the 
relative benefits and disadvantages of public naming for youth offenders 
found that naming would have a detrimental impact on youth offenders and 
their rehabilitation, victims of crime and their families.94 The Chair’s 
foreword states: 
Juvenile offenders can be punished and encouraged to take responsibility 
for their actions without being publicly named. Judicial sentences for 
juveniles can and do reflect community outrage, denouncement [sic] of the 
crime and acknowledgement of the harm caused to victims. There are 
confidential processes such as juvenile youth conferences, in which the 
offender must often face their family and the victim of their crime, that 
utilise shame constructively and supportively to help the offender 
reintegrate into the community. The importance of rehabilitation is all the 
greater when a juvenile offender is involved, since the benefits flowing to 
the offender and the community will continue for the rest of their life.  
The prohibition impacts not just on juvenile offenders, but also victims, 
their families and the media.95 
                                                 
91 Queensland, Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, Public Hearing—Youth Justice 
and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 Transcript, 3 March 2014, 7–9. 
92 Chappell and Lincoln, above n 57; O’Leary, above n 88. 
93 Chappell and Lincoln, above n 57; Chappell and Lincoln, above n 78.   
94 NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Legislative Council, The Prohibition on the 
Publication of Names of Children involved in Criminal Proceedings (2008).  
95 Ibid ix. 
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There has been little time to gauge the effects of these changes. However, in 
the recent Queensland District Court case of R v TJB, Reid J prohibited, under 
section 299A of the Youth Justice Act, publication of information identifying a 
repeat offender in circumstances where no convictions had been recorded.96 
This was done on the basis that ‘publication is unlikely to protect the 
community’, but would adversely affect his rehabilitation and ‘in that way 
increase the risk to the community’.97 This judgment again recognises that 
publication of the identity of offenders will have a negative effect on the 
rehabilitation of the child and the child’s education and employment 
prospects. In addition, it may also affect victims of crime, who may be more 
easily identified through the naming of the offenders.  
C Removing the Principle of Detention as a Last 
Resort 
Removing the principle of detention as a last resort directly contravenes 
Australia’s human rights obligations under the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and represents a fundamental change to the system of youth justice 
in Queensland. It is contrary to the tenor of the youth justice laws in other 
jurisdictions in Australia, and negates a century of developed wisdom in 
relation to childhood offending which recognises the distinction between adult 
and childhood offending and the overriding concern for rehabilitation when 
sentencing the youthful offender.  
Article 37 of the Convention stipulates that States Parties shall ensure that  
(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. 
The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with 
the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time.  
These principles are echoed in other international instruments including the 
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty 
and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. This 
principle was discussed in the 1997 Australian Law Reform Commission 
                                                 
96 R v TJB [2014] QDC 185. 
97 Ibid [25] (Reid DCJ). In coming to the decision the Court considered R v Cunningham [2014] 
QCA 88 where a publication order was refused. 
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Report Seen and Heard.98 It has also been recognised and applied by the 
courts in Queensland.99  
Every other jurisdiction in Australia has included this principle in some form 
in their youth justice legislation. The Australian Capital Territory,100 the 
Northern Territory,101 Tasmania,102 and Western Australia103 have included 
the phrase directly while New South Wales,104 Victoria105 and New Zealand106 
have done so indirectly. It is also recognised in relation to all but serious 
offenders within the South Australian legislation.107  
The Charter of Youth Justice Principles from the Convention is not directly 
legislated within the Youth Justice Act but instead has been included in 
Schedule 1 of the Act. Prior to the amendments, item 17 of Schedule 1 
stipulated that ‘A child should be detained in custody for an offence, whether 
on arrest or sentence, only as a last resort and for the least time that is justified 
in the circumstances’.108 Item 17 was deleted from the Act. The Schedule is 
incorporated through section 150(1) of the Act which sets out the sentencing 
principles for the Act. These are stated to be, inter alia, ‘the general principles 
applying to the sentencing of all persons’, ‘the youth justice principles’, and 
the ‘special considerations’ stated in section 150(2). These special 
considerations include the child’s age, which is a mitigating factor, the fact 
that a non-custodial order better promotes reintegration into the community, 
the fact that rehabilitation of a child is greatly assisted by the child’s family 
                                                 
98 Australian Law Reform Commission, Seen and Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal 
Process, Report No 84 (1997).  
99 R v SBU [2012] 1 Qd R 250; R v GDP (1991) 53 A Crim R 112. 
100 Children and Young People Act 2008 (ACT) s 94(f). 
101 Youth Justice Act (NT) s 4(c). 
102 Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) s 5(1)(g). 
103 Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA) s 7(h).  
104 Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 33(2).  
105 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) ss 361, 362(1). (a) Need to strengthen and 
preserve the relationship between the child and the child’s family (b) Desirability of allowing 
the child to live at home (c) the desirability of allowing education, training or employment of 
the child to continue without interruption or disturbance. 
106 Children Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 (NZ) s 208(d). A child or young 
person should be kept in the community where practicable. 
107 Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) s 3(3): ‘(b) family relationships between a youth, the 
youth’s parents and other members of the youth’s family should be preserved and 
strengthened; (c) a youth should not be withdrawn unnecessarily from the youth’s family 
environment; (d) there should be no unnecessary interruption of a youth’s education or 
employment.  
108 Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) sch 1 item 17 (‘Charter of Youth Justice Principles’). 
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and education or employment opportunities. Prior to the amendments they 
used also to include the fact that ‘(e) a detention order should be imposed only 
as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period’.109 This too was deleted 
from the Act. 
Section 150(2)(e) of the Queensland legislation has now been repealed, and 
according to section 150(5) of the amended Youth Justice Act,110 judges and 
magistrates must no longer apply this basic principle. The principle has been 
expressly overridden and therefore principles from prior case law are not to be 
followed in present or future judicial decisions in Queensland.111 This change 
represents a departure from a basic tenet of domestic and international youth 
justice.  
It may still be that the remaining context of the Youth Justice Act will provide 
the courts with adequate discretion to ensure that justice is done in some 
cases. In a recent appeal by a 13-year-old Indigenous boy to determine 
whether a sentence was manifestly excessive the court acknowledged that the 
principle of last resort was no longer part of the legislation. However, the 
Court considered the remaining provisions in section 150 and the Principles in 
Schedule 1 in deciding to allow the appeal on the facts.112  
Not surprisingly, the latest statistics demonstrate that the numbers of children 
in detention have increased in Queensland from an average daily number of 
134 in 2011 to 187 in 2013 and research findings clearly indicate that contact 
with and interventions by the juvenile justice system are likely to increase the 
likelihood of further offending.113 Certainly, one of the key recommendations 
                                                 
109 Ibid s 150(2). 
110 Section 150(5) of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) states that ‘This section overrides any 
other Act or law to the extent that, in sentencing a child for an offence, the court must not 
have regard to any principle that a detention order should be imposed only as a last resort’. 
111 R v RAO and BCR and BCS; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] QCA 7 [29]; R v SBU 
[2012] 1 Qd R 250; R v GDP (1991) 53 A Crim R 112; and see generally the discussion of 
NSW principles in Lester Fernandez, ‘Place of Rehabilitation in the Sentencing of Children 
for Serious Offences’ (2004) 2 Children’s Legal Service Bulletin <http://www.legalaid.nsw 
.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/6507/Place-of-rehabilitation-in-the-sentencing-of-
children-for-serious-offences.pdf>.  
112 Nicholls v Commissioner of Police [2014] QChC 5. 
113 U Gatti, R Tremblay and F Vitaro, ‘Iatrogenic Effect of Juvenile Justice’ (2009) 50(8) 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 991. 
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of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Deaths in Custody was that arresting 
and imprisoning Indigenous people should always be a last resort.114  
The Australian Institute of Criminology ‘National Deaths in Custody 
Monitoring Program’ reports that, since 1979–80, a total of 18 deaths have 
occurred in the custody of a juvenile justice agency.115 Eight of these were 
Indigenous children, and the majority were boys aged 16 and 17 years, many 
of them in detention for theft related offences.116 Eleven of the deaths were 
self-inflicted and due to hanging.117 The Report notes that ‘research from the 
United States, conducted by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, found that of the 110 suicides examined, 100 percent had 
occurred within the first four months of incarceration; of these, 40 percent 
occurred within the first 72 hours’, so even short terms in detention place 
vulnerable children at risk.118 The figures from England and Wales also 
demonstrate a number of self-inflicted deaths in custody.119 Between 1990 and 
2012, Goldson reports that 33 children died in penal custody in England and 
Wales, 31 in state prisons and two in private gaols.120  
This amendment to the Act is dangerous and has the potential to have tragic 
consequences across the board, but especially for young Indigenous people 
who end up as inmates. In this context, the amendments are especially 
concerning and constitute a fundamental departure from domestic and 
international best practice.  
                                                 
114 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report 
(1991) vol 3, [21.2], [22].  
115 Mathew Lyneham and Andy Chan, ‘Deaths in Custody in Australia to 30 June 2011: 
Twenty Years of Monitoring by the National Deaths in Custody Program since the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody’ (Monitoring report No 20, Australian 
Institute of Criminology, 2013).  
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ian Hayes, Characteristics of Juvenile Suicide in Confinement (Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention, US Department of Justice, 2009) quoted in Lyneham and Chan, 
above n 115, 73; Similarly, research in the United Kingdom has shown that approximately 50 
per cent of suicide-related incidents occurred within the first month of incarceration: J Shaw 
and P Turnbull, ‘Suicide in Custody’ (2009) 8(7) Psychiatry Journal 265. 
119 Deaths of Young People and Children in Prison (11 September 2014) (Inquest) 
<http://www.inquest.org.uk/statistics/deaths-of-young-people-and-children-in-prison>. See 
also Barry Goldson and Deborah Coles, In the Care of the State? Child Deaths in Penal 
Custody in England & Wales (Inquest, 2005). 
120 Barry Goldson, We Must Do More to Protect Our Children (24 April 2014) The 
Conversation <http://theconversation.com/we-must-do-more-to-protect-children-in-prison-
25631>. 
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D Entrenching 17 Years as the Age of Criminal 
Responsibility in Queensland 
Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that: ‘For the 
purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below 
the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, 
majority is attained earlier’.121 Prior to this age, there are two categories into 
which young offenders will fall. Children are not held responsible for a 
criminal offence under 10 years in any Australian jurisdiction, nor in New 
Zealand, England and Wales.122 In Canada the applicable age is under 12.123 
In Australia older children — children from 10 to 14 years — have the benefit 
of the principle of doli incapax. This means that there is a rebuttable 
presumption that they are not criminally responsible unless it is proved that 
they knew that what they did was wrong as opposed to merely naughty or 
mischievous. Once again this principle is operative across all the Australian 
jurisdictions, as well as NZ,124 although section 34 of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 (UK) has abolished doli incapax in the UK.125 If children are 
charged with criminal offences in Queensland then they are dealt with under 
the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld). According to Schedule 4 of that Act, a 
‘child’ for the purposes of the Act means ‘(a) a person who has not turned 17 
years’. Those offenders over 17 are dealt with as adults. 
By treating 17 year olds as adults for the purposes of the criminal justice 
system, Queensland has been out of step with current practice both nationally 
and internationally for the last two decades. As is evident from the following 
                                                 
121 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 
3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).  
122 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 25; Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 5; 
Criminal Code Act (NT) s 38(1); Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) s 5; Criminal Code Act 
1924 (Tas) s 18(1); Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 29(1); Children, Youth and Families Act 
2005 (Vic) s 344; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 29; Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth) s 4M; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 7.1; Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 21; Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933 (UK) s 50. 
123 Under 12 in Canada Criminal Code 1985 (Can) s 13. No child under eight can be guilty of 
an offence and no child under 12 can be prosecuted for an offence under the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 ss 41–41A. 
124 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 26(1); Criminal Code Act (NT) s 38(2); Criminal Code Act 
1924 (Tas) s 18(2); Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 29(2); R v ALH (2003) 6 VR 276; 
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 29; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4N; Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 7.2; Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 22;  
125 See Regina v J T B (Appellant) (on appeal from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division) 
[2009] AC 1310, 1329 [7]: ‘It had become customary to speak of the presumption of doli 
incapax as embracing both the presumption and the defence. In using the language of s 34 of 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK), Parliament intended to abolish both the presumption and 
the defence’.   
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table, all the states of Australia, as well as England, Wales and Canada, use 18 
as the age of majority for criminal responsibility. Only New Zealand and 
Scotland have lower age limits.  
 
Comparative Table: Legislative Age Limits 
 Age up to which dealt 
with in a youth court     
Reference   
Queensland Under 17 years of age Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), sch 4 
Northern Territory Under 18 years of age  Youth Justice Act (NT) s 6.  
Western Australia Under 18 years of age Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA) s 3  
Victoria Under 18 years of age Children, Youth and Families Act 
2005 (Vic) s 3 
South Australia Under 18 years of age Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) s 4  
New South Wales Under 18 years of age Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 
1987 (NSW) s 3  
ACT Under 18 years of age Children and Young People Act 2008 
(ACT) s 12 
Tasmania  Under 18 years of age Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) s 3 
England and Wales 
  
 
 
Canada 
 
 
NZ 
 
 
Scotland 
Under 18 years of age 
  
 
 
Under 18 years of age 
 
 
Under 17 years of age 
 
 
Under 16 years of age 
 
Children and Young Persons Act 
1933 (UK) s 107; Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 (UK) s 117. 
 
Youth Criminal Justice Act 2003 
(Can) s 2 
 
Children Young Persons and Their 
Families Act 1989 (NZ) s 2(1) 
 
Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s 93; 
Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 
2011 s 199 
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The US Supreme Court in Roper v Simmons rejected the imposition of the 
death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18.126 In his judgment, Justice 
Kennedy discussed the three main differences between juveniles and adults as 
being ‘a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’, lack 
of control and vulnerability to external pressure, and underdeveloped 
personality traits.127 His deliberations led to the conclusion that, despite all the 
objections to categorised rules, ‘a line must be drawn’.128  
The Queensland Commission for Children and Young People and Child 
Guardian reported that, during the 2011–2012 reporting period, 230 young 
people aged 17 years were being accommodated in high security adult 
correctional facilities across Queensland, of whom 27.4 per cent were held on 
remand.129 Approximately half of these were Indigenous (52.2 per cent) and 
9.1 per cent were girls.130 The most common offences were property offences, 
followed by violent offences and driving offences.131 Almost 5 per cent of the 
total population of 17 year olds subject to finalised Child Protection Orders 
during 2011–12 were also subject to orders in the adult correctional system.132 
The Commission pointed out how anomalous this situation was, bearing in 
mind the State’s guardianship obligations under the Child Protection Act 
1999.133 
International human rights frameworks stipulate that youth offenders should 
be subject to a separate system of criminal justice from adult offenders. In 
2012, the UN Committee expressed concern that ‘All 17-year-old child 
offenders continue to be tried under the Criminal Justice system in the State 
party’s territory of Queensland)’ and ‘Although the majority of 17 year olds 
are held separately from the wider prison population, there are still cases of 
children being held within adult correctional centres’.134   
                                                 
126 Roper v Simmons 543 US 541 (2005). See also discussion in Terry Hutchinson and Jamie 
Nuich, ‘Drawing the Line: The Legal Status and Treatment of 17-year-old Accused in 
Queensland’ (2011) 17 (2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 91. 
127 Roper v Simmons 543 US 541 (2005) 569–70. 
128 Ibid 574. 
129 Queensland Commission for Children and Young People and Child Guardian, Child 
Guardian Report: Youth Justice System 2011-12 (2013) 120 <http://pandora.nla. 
gov.au/pan/14014/20140630-0820/www.ccypcg.qld.gov.au/pdf/publications/reports/Child-
Guardian-Report_Youth-Justice-System_2013/FinalYJReport2011-12.pdf>. 
130 Ibid 121. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid 15. 
133 Ibid 23. 
134 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above n 78, 21 [82]–[83]. 
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Pursuant to the recent amendments to the Youth Justice Act, 17 year olds who 
have six or more months remaining in detention will be transferred to an adult 
facility. This amendment further entrenches the current rule and, in removing 
judicial discretion in this area, additionally places young people in a more 
vulnerable position within the corrections system than they would otherwise 
have been in. The Queensland Law Society in its submission on the Bill 
expressed support for ‘the maintenance of judicial discretion in these 
matters’.135 The Society also considered that: 
maintenance of programs, such as access to educational support, is 
instrumental for a young person held in State custody. Transfer of a young 
person to an adult prison may undermine the progress made by a young 
person and remove the structure and discipline provided to them, but also 
undermine the investment made by these programs. The ability for 
continued access to these programs must be assessed by the courts on the 
facts of each particular case.136  
The Society also notes that there may sometimes be a failure to transfer a 
young person’s security level when he or she is transferred to adult prison, so 
young people coming into adult prison may be placed in high security settings 
where previously they had been on the lowest security level.137  
So, apart from the increased risks of physical harm, young people are 
vulnerable to a range of harms from being detained in adult gaols.138 Kelly 
Richards argues that:  
a range of factors, including juveniles’ lack of maturity, propensity to take 
risks and susceptibility to peer influence, as well as intellectual disability, 
mental illness and victimisation, increase juveniles’ risks of contact with the 
criminal justice system.139  
A study of the mental health needs of young offenders who had committed 
serious crimes and had been transferred to adult court and subsequently 
incarcerated in a prison for adults revealed that ‘mental health treatment needs 
appear to be even more pronounced in the small subgroup of youths 
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transferred to the adult criminal justice system and incarcerated in adult 
prison’.140 The research demonstrates that treating young offenders in this 
manner may provide a cheaper option than incarceration in youth detention 
centres, but is counterproductive from the point of view of the children and 
the community in the long term. 
Gaols are dangerous places for young men between 16 and 21. Despite 
statements from the government that rape does not occur in Queensland 
detention facilities, this is far from the case.141 In addition, research findings 
indicate that there is generally a higher risk that a youth will experience 
sexual abuse and mental health problems in adult gaols than in juvenile 
facilities.142 Moving the small number of 17 year olds out of youth detention 
is not going to alleviate the overcrowding in the youth detention centres to 
any great degree, but these youths will be placed in more danger of harm in 
the adult system.  
E Creating a New Offence where a Child Commits a 
Further Offence while on Bail 
A new offence has been created for young offenders who are found guilty of 
committing an offence while on bail. This was one amendment to the Youth 
Justice Act that did have a relatively strong response in the Justice Department 
Survey in 2013, with 66.3 per cent of the admittedly small number of 
responses compared to the overall Queensland population indicating that it 
should be an offence for a child to breach bail conditions.143 In all of the 
Australian states it is an offence not to appear for the court hearing when on 
bail for an offence.144 In the Northern Territory, South Australia, Tasmania 
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and Western Australia it is also an offence to fail to comply with bail 
conditions.145  
Bail breaches are often the result of unrealistically onerous bail conditions 
being put in place. However the new provision limits the additional offence to 
situations where a child has committed another ‘offence’ while the child is on 
bail, rather than a mere technical breach of conditions. Under section 59A of 
the Act, if 
(a) the child is granted bail after being charged with an original offence; and 
(b) a finding of guilt is later made against the child for a subsequent offence 
committed while on bail for the original offence[,] 
(2) [t]he finding of guilt made against the child for the subsequent offence is 
taken to be an offence against this Act. 
The maximum penalty is 20 penalty units or 1 year’s imprisonment. 
The Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) section 4(2) indicates that 
legislation must have ‘sufficient regard to rights and liberties of individuals’. 
This will be contingent on the fact that, among other things, the legislation 
‘does not reverse the onus of proof in criminal proceedings without adequate 
justification’.146 Section 59B(3) of the Youth Justice Act reverses the onus of 
proof in relation to the new offence so that: ‘Upon production to the court of 
the copy of the bail order or copy of the child’s undertaking the court must 
immediately call on the child to prove why the child should not be convicted 
of an offence under section 59A’. There is no guarantee in this situation that 
the child will have an opportunity to fully prepare a case, or indeed have 
representation. Section 59B(1) states that the proceeding for an offence under 
section 59A ‘(a) may be started without complaint and summons; and (b) 
must be started immediately after the child is found guilty of the subsequent 
offence’.  
The section does not refer specifically to the more serious ‘indictable’ 
offences. If the child is charged with a simple, summary or regulatory offence 
while on bail — for example a fare evasion charge — then the child could 
become liable to up to twelve months in detention. This is so even though the 
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child has not been tried or convicted of the original offence for which the 
child has been charged and placed on bail. This amendment has a potential to 
criminalise children unnecessarily. Even though the child has not been found 
guilty of the primary offence, the child is no longer a ‘first time offender’ 
under the new categorisation in the Act. This amendment is unnecessary and 
has the potential to inflate a child’s record which can then have a further 
effect in subsequent proceedings.     
F Mandatory Sentencing 
Mandatory sentencing laws require courts to impose minimum sentences of 
detention or imprisonment for people convicted of certain offences. They 
effectively remove judicial discretion in relation to those offences. The High 
Court has consistently held that it is the role of the courts and the sentencing 
judge to take into account all of the circumstances of the offence and offender 
in determining an appropriate sentence.147  
Mandatory sentencing has been used in the past in both Western Australia and 
the Northern Territory.148 The Northern Territory mandatory sentencing 
provisions applying to youths convicted of repeat property offences were 
repealed in 2001.149 In the second reading speech for the Northern Territory 
Juvenile Justice Amendment Act (No 2) 2001, Peter Toyne, Attorney-General 
for the Territory, stated that the mandatory provisions were being repealed 
because: 
the regime has resulted in the imposition of unjust and inappropriate 
sentences of imprisonment while having no positive impact on the crime 
rate. There is no evidence to suggest that under mandatory sentencing 
offenders have been deterred from committing property offences. Moreover, 
the mandatory sentencing regime has done nothing for victims. The current 
minimum mandatory sentencing regime for property offences provides no 
scope for discretion except insofar as it commits the imposition of greater 
sentences. This has resulted in a regime that operates unfairly and 
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inconsistently. Because the mandatory minimum periods apply to all types 
of property offences, the current regime has not properly targeted suitable 
offences. We have seen inappropriate sentences of imprisonment apply to 
trivial offences and inadequate sentences apply to more serious offences 
such as housebreaking.150 
A ‘three strikes and you’re in’ bill applying to those convicted of a third 
offence of home burglary is, at the time of writing, before the Western 
Australian Parliament. The Criminal Law Amendment (Home Burglary and 
Other Offences) Bill 2014 (WA) would introduce changes which would apply 
to juveniles aged over 16 with the intention being to ‘allow young offenders 
one chance at avoiding a sentence of detention before three burglary offences 
trigger a mandatory term of one year in detention’. The President of the 
Childrens Court, Judge Denis Reynolds, has warned that the amendments are 
‘costly and ineffective and could encourage teenagers to pressure younger 
children to commit crimes’.151  
In 2012, the UN Committee report on Australian compliance with the 
Convention expressed concern that ‘Mandatory sentencing legislation (so-
called “three strikes laws”) still exists in the Criminal Code of Western 
Australia for persons under 18’.152 Despite this, the Queensland government 
has introduced mandatory sentencing provisions into the Youth Justice Act. 
The provisions apply only to those children within certain local government 
areas. According to the new section 176B, together with section 206A(1), of 
the Youth Justice Act, if a child ‘(a) is found guilty of a vehicle offence; and 
(b) is a recidivist vehicle offender’, then the court ‘must make a boot camp 
(vehicle offences) order against [the] child’. A recidivist vehicle offender is a 
child who:  
(a) is found guilty of a vehicle offence (the relevant vehicle offence); and  
(b) has, on or before the day the child is found guilty of the relevant vehicle 
offence, been found guilty of 2 or more other vehicle offences; and  
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(c) committed the other vehicle offences within 1 year before or on the day 
the relevant vehicle offence was committed.153 
The ‘relevant vehicle offence’ is unlawful use of a motor vehicle under 
section 408A of the Criminal Code (Qld).154 Section 206B(1) of the Act 
provides that the boot camp order must be for a period of at least three months 
but not more than six months. If children run away from the boot camps then 
a warrant can be issued for their arrest and the child can be brought before a 
court to be charged with another offence.155  
These provisions target only repeat offenders involved in a specific type of 
offence in a stipulated geographical area. This is unequal justice in that one 
category of offender charged with one specific type of offence in certain 
geographic districts is being sentenced differently from a similar category of 
offender in other local government areas of the state.156 This breaches 
fundamental tenets of sound legislation which exist to ensure equality before 
the law. In addition the provisions are retrospective, once again in 
contravention of the Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld). 
The boot camps that have been established in Queensland fit into two distinct 
categories — early intervention boot camps and sentenced youth boot camps. 
Early intervention camps are aimed at children who for a myriad of reasons 
are identified by their family, community or the police as being ‘at risk’ but 
have not been charged or sentenced for a criminal offence. The Sentenced 
Youth Boot Camp program is an additional sentencing option and was 
initially available only to young offenders from the Cairns region. The Cairns 
boot camp was closed after the first two children sent to the program escaped. 
Another facility of the same kind has now been opened at a remote station at 
Lincoln Springs just over 200 kms from Townsville.157 A total of 17 young 
offenders have attended the camp since its opening, ‘with one removed for 
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failing to embrace the rehabilitation program’.158 The boot camp order has 
now been extended once again to Cairns.159  
There is no empirical evidence to suggest that boot camps are good for 
stopping the cycle of youth crime and closing the revolving door of youth 
detention.160 Wilson’s meta-analysis of 32 robust research studies of 
‘militaristic’ boot camps concluded that ‘this common and defining feature of 
a boot-camp is not effective in reducing post boot-camp offending’.161 
Wilson and Lipsey’s research has clearly demonstrated that boot camps and 
wilderness camps are ineffective unless they include a strong therapeutic 
focus on education, families, and psychological and behavioural change.162 
The consensus of the extensive US literature on boot camps is that they are 
not effective in deterring crime or reoffending or in in promoting 
rehabilitation.163 
IV CONCLUSION 
Many of the amendments discussed in this article are directed towards a 
category of ‘persistent young offender’ which comprises a very small 
proportion of the entire group of offenders. Holistic responses targeted at 
repeat offenders in this specific group are likely to be a more effective 
response. Labelling children by permitting identifying information about them 
to be published, and opening the Children’s Court for youth justice matters, 
have not been proven to be effective deterrent strategies.  
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The removal of the principle of ‘detention as a last resort’ represents a 
fundamental change to the system of youth justice in Queensland and is not 
supported by the statistics on offending or empirical research into recidivism. 
This removal is contrary to the tenor of the youth justice laws in other 
jurisdictions in Australia and contravenes Australia’s human rights obligations 
under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
The accepted age of majority for most civil rights in Australia is 18 years of 
age. By treating 17 year olds as adults for the purposes of the criminal justice 
system, Queensland’s Youth Justice Act 1992 has been out of step with 
current practice both nationally and internationally for decades. The latest 
legislative amendment further entrenches this anomaly, and in removing 
judicial discretion in this area it additionally places young people in a more 
vulnerable position within the corrections system.  
The fact that a breach of bail conditions now results in a second criminal 
offence, especially in circumstances where guilt in relation to the original 
offence has not been determined, is an unwarranted and harsh response to 
juvenile offending. The provision of mandatory penalties that are applicable 
only to a known group of offenders from one geographical area offends 
principles of equal justice for all citizens. It is also likely to unduly penalise 
Indigenous children and therefore is racially divisive.  
These changes are contrary to Australia’s international obligations and in 
many instances offend the principles set out in the Legislative Standards Act 
1992 (Qld). Early evaluations of the changed policy demonstrate that the 
numbers of children in detention in Queensland are rising and that the 
detention facilities are unable to house the numbers without overcrowding. 
Further evaluations of these changes need to be undertaken immediately to 
ensure that the legislation is having the desired outcomes in terms of the 
stated government policies, judged by criteria such as statistics of offending 
and reoffending, court and detention costs, and effects on Indigenous youth 
wellbeing. 
